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ABSTRACT 
This paper uses school choice policy as an example to demonstrate how local actors 
adopt, mediate, translate, and reformulate “choice” as neo-liberal rhetoric informing 
education reform. Complex processes exist between global policy about school choice 
and the local practice of school choice. 
Based on the theoretical sensibility of global-local framing, this paper discusses how a 
neo-liberal discourse of education reform came about in Taiwan and in particular how 
the Fundamental Education Act of 1999 introduced choice. The Act incorporated choice 
as global rhetoric into existing school practice, resulting in a hybrid school-choice 
model which mixes a civil rights model and a market model. This study compares two 
junior high schools to illustrate how this hybrid model of school choice plays out in the 
complex realities of actual schools and discusses the effects of such a hybrid school-
choice model on broader Taiwanese public education. This paper concludes that the 
school choice practices of parents, compounded with the neo-liberal rhetoric of 
education reform in Taiwan, is rapidly exacerbating the great disparity between public 
junior high schools. 
Keywords: school choice, parental involvement, globalization, local, hybridization 
INTRODUCTION 
Many countries, including Australia, England, and the United States, have used neo-liberal ideas 
to restructure so-called unresponsive and inefficient public school systems. Neo-liberal policy 
initiatives are reshaping educational systems in complex and varied ways globally and locally 
(Arnove, 2003; Burbules and Torres, 2000; Popkewitz, 2000, 2003; Rizvi, 2004). As adopted in 
Taiwan, these same ideas have produced different meanings. Although Taiwan’s neo-liberal ideas 
of education reform derive from the United States and Australia, local entities have reformulated 
these policies and reinserted them into local contexts to meet particular interests and personal 
needs. Education reform efforts must deal not only with global concerns, such as global 
competitiveness and efficiency, but also with local educational problems, such as educational 
democratization and education fanaticism in Taiwan (Ho, 2009). 
There are always multiple logics behind the local adoption and adaption of global discourses of 
education reform and restructuring. To explore these logics, in this study I use school choice as an 
example of how the state and reformers have integrated a neo-liberal sense of education reform 
policies into the public school system and how the local participants (including parents) have 
transformed the choice policy into a hybrid model of civil rights participation and market 
competition. I also discuss the effect of this hybrid model on local schools by comparing two 
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extreme cases of junior high schools in terms of the reasons and strategies behind parental choice 
and modes of parental involvement.  
In the first section of this paper I discuss a theoretical framework that informs global and local 
framing of education reform policy. In the second section I briefly introduce the Taiwanese 
school catchment system and a loophole within it that, exploited by parents for many years, has 
thus become part of the system. In the third section I present an ethnographic study of two junior 
high schools in terms of parental choice and involvement. In the fourth section I formulate a 
hybrid school-choice model and discuss its broader impact on the Taiwanese education system. 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AS A GLOBAL AND LOCAL MIXTURE 
“Choice” is one of the key slogans of education reform in many countries. The assumption is that 
“centralization and bureaucratization are substantially at odds with the effective organization of 
schools and the successful provision of education” (Chubb and Moe, 1990, p. 142). This 
assumption brings decentralization, deregulation, and choice into the discourse of education 
reform. Choice and quality frameworks increasingly embed or subsume equity concerns. By re-
embedding issues of quality and equity within choice and accountability frameworks, neo-liberal 
thinking about education reform is not only popular, but also very seductive for many 
governments across the globe. As many theorists point out, there is a global convergence of 
education restructuring in which global ideas of reform are usually internalized within a national 
debate, so that when a society adopts the international language of reform (such as market, choice, 
and deregulation), it serves not only as a functional strategy of reform, but also as a local 
discourse partially projecting particular national interests and political ideologies (Ozga and 
Lingard, 2007; Ozga et al., 2006; Popkewitz, 2000, 2003).  
Popkewitz (2000) mentions that any discourse of education reform is a hybrid that appropriates 
global discourses into national concerns. He points out that when a nation deploys a global 
discourse of reform to reformulate its national education system, reform ideas tend to be adopted 
without considering their history in terms of time and place. They travel across national 
boundaries in the form of universal principles, but are also reformulated into transmogrified forms 
that meet particular national and local interests.  
Taiwan is a case in point. During the period from 1987 through the 1990s, deregulation and 
liberalization as the leading discourses of the education reform movement were strongly 
intertwined with the national idea of democratization (Mao, 1997; Xue, 1996). They resonated 
with Taiwan’s social leanings toward democratization, which involved a range of initiatives to 
increase local autonomy and strengthen civil society relative to authoritarian state control. Thus, 
the reformulation of global ideas of neo-liberalism for education reform in the Taiwanese context 
has not necessarily been the same as the corresponding formulations discursively constructed in 
the United States or England (e.g., Apple, 2000; Whitty, 1997). There was a process of 
hybridization already underway when the global idea of neo-liberalism for education reform was 
adopted in Taiwan during the 1990s. The discourses of these reform efforts were not only tied to 
the ideas of national democratization and social justice, but also heavily relied on borrowing 
strategies from neo-liberal ideas of education restructuring, such as choice (Mao and Chang, 
2005; Ho, 2009). Combining the global and local levels of policy borrowing and hybridization, in 
this paper I take two junior high schools in Taiwan as examples of what happens as these neo-
liberal reform policies travel down to the local level and are refracted through a local system that 
has already developed its own local practice of school choice. In the following section I introduce 
Taiwanese school culture and school choice practices, and how, since the 1990s, they have been 
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reshaped by the neo-liberal education policies formulated in response to Taiwan’s education 
reform movement. 
School choice in the catchment area system 
In the Taiwanese education system, elementary school education and lower-level secondary 
education are compulsory and free for children between the ages of 6 and 15. Recent statistics 
show that 97.6% of elementary and junior high schools are public, with only a very small number 
of private schools (2.4%) (Ministry of Education, 2014). The public elementary and junior high 
school a student attends is determined by a system of catchment areas based on the geographic 
distribution of public schools, so as to ensure that students can attend nearby schools in 
accordance with the rules laid out in the Constitution. This school system aspires to provide equal 
educational opportunities by providing equal funding for all schools. Such a public education 
system reflects the assumption that each public school provides the same quality of education. 
However, a primary concern of parents is that their children pass the competitive entrance 
examination for prestigious high schools. There is a gap between providing equal quality of 
public education and the personal desire for upward social mobility. As many Western studies 
point out, where you live can significantly affect the quality of your children’s educational 
experience (Elmore, 1986; Wells & Crain, 1992). However, for some parents in Taiwan, this 
quality is more an issue of which schools your child attends than an issue of where you live. 
Therefore, parents tend to believe that only “superstar schools”1 can properly prepare their 
children for passing the entrance exams to prestigious high schools. As a result, if no such 
“superstar school” is located within a given catchment area, many parents simply change the 
family’s official address without actually moving their residence. Parents devote much time and 
energy to deciding which school to enrol their children in and where to live, which creates 
problems for popular schools because applications far exceed available places. Such situations are 
much worse in densely populated areas than in less densely populated regions (Lin, 2000; Chang, 
2000).   
The Taiwanese educational reform movement since the 1990s 
While parents continuously update and share their knowledge of school choice strategies in their 
catchment area, Taiwanese society and the Taiwanese education system have also been 
undergoing rapid changes. In the 1990s the democratic movement argued for deregulation in 
education by transferring decision-making powers from central control to public control (Mao, 
1997). Parents’ right to exercise greater choice over their children’s education embodied the 
democratic ideal and individual civil rights. Promoting parental choice and parental involvement 
justified the push to make schooling more diverse and more responsive to the needs of parents. It 
was claimed that parental choice and involvement could serve not only to correct an overly 
authoritarian style of schooling, but also to improve the quality of education (Yang & Lin, 1994; 
410 Education Restructuring League, 1996). The call for education reform in the 1990s reflected 
the social trend of democratization and efficiency that involved a range of initiatives to increase 
local autonomy and the transfer of state control to local management.  
In the aforementioned social and political context, the discourses of parental choice, parental 
involvement, and education rights finally became a part of the Fundamental Education Act, 
approved by legislators in the national assembly and announced in 1999. The Act clearly includes 
provisions which increase parents’ ability to choose which schools their children attend, promote 
private sector involvement in establishing schools, and allow for the “publically funded-privately 
run” model in the public school system. The Act also provides a legal basis by which parents are 
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eligible to participate in the decision-making processes underlying the formation and execution of 
school policies and have the right of educational choice in terms of selecting schools, educational 
content, and instruction methods.  
Although choosing a school outside the family’s catchment area is not uncommon, and although 
the Fundamental Education Act legally ensures parents’ right to choose their children’s education, 
what are the compounding effects of such a reform policy on local school practice? Who will 
benefit from such a new hybrid policy? How will parents exercise their right to choose, and how 
will they involve themselves in school affairs? The problematic of these questions comes from the 
theoretical sensibility in which choice as the global idea of reform, rather than following a direct 
route, circulates and is then incorporated into existing local practices. Next, I introduce two 
schools as examples of parental choice, participation, and involvement in daily school life at the 
current conjuncture of global-local policy circulation and local appropriation of reform policy. 
METHODS AND DATA COLLECTION 
In this section I compare two schools (School A and School B) in terms of parents’ strategies of 
choice and modes of involvement. School A and School B are junior high schools located in the 
greater Taipei area. 
School A is located in a prosperous area of Taipei City. The socio-economic status of the 
students’ parents is, on average, higher than that of School B. Many of School A’s parents work 
at big corporations and a hospital nearby. Because a consistently high percentage of its students 
attend top-end high schools, School A is widely recognized as one of the most popular superstar 
schools in Taipei. 
School B is located in one of Taipei’s satellite cities, nearby the intersection of two major 
highways and quite close to a soon-to-be-established line of the MRT (Metropolitan Rapid 
Transit). Because of its convenient location and flexible transportation options, new housing 
projects started appearing in this area twenty years ago, attracting many new families and young 
couples who could not afford the prohibitively expensive real estate in Taipei City. School B 
serves both old and new communities, and features a racially and ethnically diverse student body. 
Most of its students are graduates of the three elementary schools in its catchment area. These 
three elementary schools respectively represent the three different kinds of communities in the 
region: traditional, aboriginal, and new. The traditional community comprises families who have 
lived there for many generations working in occupations related to agriculture. This area also 
attracts many aboriginals from the east coast of Taiwan who migrate to the city looking for work. 
The third community comprises residents who have arrived in the area in the last decade, whose 
ethnic and racial background tends to be Han-Chinese, and who tend to hold white-collar jobs. 
The following two tables present the basic information about these two schools. 
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TABLE 1. Basic Information about School A and School B for 2009 
Item School A School B 
Space 27,421 m2 34,248 m2 
Average space per student 10.07 m2 28.05 m2 
Number of classes 72 39 
Number of students 2,724 1,221 
Number of teachers 171 84 
Student-teacher ratio (national 
average is 15:1) 
15.93 14.54 
 
TABLE 2. High school admission of graduates of School A and School B for 2009 
Item  School A School B 
Total number of graduates 925 508 
Number of graduates who 
gained admission to a public 
high school 
648 (70%) 91 (18%) 
Number of graduates who 
gained admission to one of 
Taipei’s top three high schools 
224 (24%) 10 (2%) 
As Table 1 shows, the two schools differ little in terms of student-teacher ratio, owing to the equal 
distribution of educational resources stipulated by national education provisions. However, there 
is a significant difference between School A and School B regarding four matters: number of 
students, average space for each student, the percentage of graduates who gained admission to one 
of Taipei’s top three high schools, and the percentage of graduates who gained admission to a 
public high school.  
This research was conducted from September 2008 to June 2009. I paid regular visits to each 
school and attended various school-wide and class-level activities, especially both school-wide 
and class-level parent association (PA) meetings, usually held at the beginning of the spring and 
fall semesters. At each school I interviewed the head of the school-wide PA, the principal, the 
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director of academic affairs, and three homeroom teachers. With the school staff, I asked what 
reasons parents gave for choosing the school and how the parents participated in school affairs 
and the PAs. With the heads of the PAs, I asked about the duties and functions of the PAs and 
about school-PA relations. I processed and thematically coded the in-depth interview data to 
illustrate the complex realities of school choice and parental involvement at the two schools. The 
major themes identified are summarized in Table 3.  
Table 3. Summary of major themes 
 School A  School B 
1. Reasons 
behind  choice 
of school 
‧ School’s impressive academic 
performance / status 
‧ Student clubs’ excellent 
performance in national 
competitions 
‧ Attractive ethos (achievement 
orientation, highly 
competitive) 
‧ Experienced and devoted 
faculty 
‧ Near parents’ place of work 
‧ Sibling-related factors 
‧ School’s appeal to parents’ 
aspirations for improved 
academic performance 
‧ School’s community-based 
appearance 
‧ New school with good 
facilities 
‧ Near parents’ home 
‧ Spacious campus with great 
view 
 





‧ Volunteering and financial 
donations  
‧ Parental supervision of 
homework 
‧ Enjoyment of social-structure 
resources  
‧ Influencing the allocation of 
teachers in parents’ favour 
‧ Taking strong initiatives to 
establish an afterschool 
program for entrance-exam 
preparation 
‧ Volunteering 
‧ Little or no supervision of 
homework 
‧ Absence of pronounced 
parental participation or 
only limited social and 
cultural capital and time 
‧ Different views of and 
approaches to afterschool 
programs for entrance-exam 
preparation 
3. Dynamic of 
the school’s 
culture 
‧ Competition among teachers 
‧ Highly regarded teachers and 
classes 
‧ Pride in being associated with 
the school’s revered “brand 
name” 
‧ Student hardship and stress 
over learning 
‧ Teachers’ and parents’ 
ambivalence over presence 
in school: should I stay or 
should I go? 
‧ Inexperienced teachers 
‧ Assigning blame to others 
‧ Viewing aboriginal 
community as a bad 
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influence upon their 
students 
‧ The principal’s strong and 
even inflexible leadership  
Modes of parental participation and involvement 
The Fundamental Education Act enshrines parents’ right to participate in school affairs. Article 8 
of the Act outlines two dimensions of this right. One is the parents’ right to choose which schools 
their children attend, educational content, and methods of instruction. The second is their right to 
participate in decision-making in school policies and development. The Act requires reserving at 
least one-fifth of school board positions for PA members. Traditionally, teachers have a high 
status in Taiwanese society, and parents respect teachers and appreciate what schools do for their 
children. However, such an unconditional respect and appreciation has been somewhat 
undermined by parents’ increased rights in education. The daily practices of parental involvement 
in Schools A and B have resulted in a transition from education as a given to education as an 
entitlement. 
Previously, the main function of the PA was fundraising for the school, with very limited 
involvement otherwise. Rather than working in equal partnership with parents, both school 
administrators and teachers preferred that parents respond to teachers’ requests for such assistance 
as support at special events and class supervision. However, since the enactment of the new 
legislation, this situation has been changing. School A, for example, has benefited from its PA’s 
donations as well as parents’ devotion of substantial amounts of time to school-related matters. 
However, there has been a growing ambivalence on the part of teachers toward parental 
involvement in school-related matters. Teachers, on the one hand, appreciate parents’ supervision 
of students’ classroom work and parents’ help in organizing afterschool programs. On the other 
hand, teachers complain about parents’ obsession with drills and tests in preparation for the 
entrance exam—an obsession that places pressure on teachers and can interfere with their 
professional role. Some of School A’s parents participate not only in classroom management and 
teaching, but also in the school’s decision-making, including the review and selection of 
principals, curriculum development, and the allocation of homeroom teachers and subject 
teachers. Some teachers resent this parental monitoring of teachers, resulting in a contradictory 
blend of parents’ polite support of school-initiated matters and parents’ sometimes forceful efforts 
to guide certain affairs, especially regarding their children’s “best interests” in achieving 
outstanding academic performance. 
Due to school B’s diverse student body (reflecting three different demographic groups) its PA is 
less united and less competent than School A’s. I discovered that there were different factions 
within School B’s PA, each with differing opinions about the future development of the school. 
Some parents supported the school’s policy of keeping a special program on aboriginal culture in 
the curriculum, mainly as a way of gaining extra-funding from the government, while some 
parents were strongly against it, claiming that it tainted the reputation of the school, resulting in 
lower enrolment over time. An overarching consequence of these differences was that School B’s 
PA had difficulty achieving consensus. There was also a growing distrust between the parents and 
the school administration, as well as among parents. Compared to School A, where most parents 
and teachers were vocally proud of their association with the school because of its academic 
reputation, at School B many people affiliated with the school blamed others for perceived 
 Choice as a global language in local practice 
108 
failings at the school. In such an atmosphere, many parents and staff sometimes wondered 
whether they should stay or go.  
From school-choice strategies to forms of parental participation, there was a huge difference 
between the parent-teacher interactions at the two schools. At School A some influential parents 
were able to exercise significant power over the school, not only by identifying and taking 
advantage of loopholes in admission procedures, but also by forming an information-sharing 
network about school policies and teacher performance. These parents dominated the school 
board and steered school policy toward their personal interests. In this way, parents and the school 
were not working in partnership. Teachers felt that the PA had them under observation, which 
created unhealthy competition amongst teachers for winning over parents’ and gaining their 
support and praise. In contrast, the factional orientation between School B’s three communities 
weakened or even prevented connections among parents, causing further distrust between school 
staff and among parents, essentially paralysing the function of the PA. 
School choice: Community or Market? Diversity or Disparity? 
According to the National Education Act, educational authorities must provide Taiwanese 
children with equal access to good-quality schools, regardless of social status or location. Yet,  
the Fundamental Education Act allow parents to choose which schools their children attend. 
When the Ministry of Education integrated parental choice into public schools, it assumed that 
parents would act in their best interests, thus strengthening parental participation in public 
schools. The policy was viewed not only as providing avenues for exercising civil rights, but also 
as a strategy for improving schools.  However, the implementation of such a policy needs to be 
seen as situated in a historically embedded choice practice and culturally bounded social network.  
In a democratic society, education plays a key role in developing capacities that enable people to 
become involved in the political process. This was the aim of enacting the Fundamental 
Education Act in the context of the political democratization and educational liberalization 
occurring in Taiwan during the 1990s. The Act states that educational rights are part of one’s civil 
rights. It protects individuals from unwarranted action by government and guarantees the right to 
participate in school affairs without discrimination. Promoting parental involvement gives the 
impression that granting opportunities for participating in a decision-making process will create a 
sense of collective choice for improving schools within communities. However, the long-standing 
habit of middle-class parents choosing superstar schools also poses a challenge to the collectivism 
of the community.  
Levin (2007) suggests that local management is different from parental involvement. He asserts 
that local management and parental involvement are only sensible if the policy assumes a genuine 
interest in the community. However, there are two senses of community: a social group in a 
specific locality, and a group sharing common characteristics and interests. Levin takes 
community in the former sense. In this regard, the present study shows that the school staff of 
School A is very proud of its talented students but has a less pronounced sense of being a 
community school than does School B. As School A’s director of academic affairs noted, “We are 
not a community school. . . . [But] our school attracts students from at least fifty-four different 
elementary schools.” 
Parents involved in School A had their own sense of community (sharing the same interests and 
characteristics) because many of their children attended the same primary school together. These 
parents exercised collective strategies for participating in school life, and shared similar 
economic, cultural, and social capital, giving rise to a network in which parents looked to other 
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parents for help in deciding how to get involved in their school. The objective of this involvement 
was to strengthen their children’s future prospects. Parents with economic, cultural, and social 
resources could compensate for perceived deficiencies in the school budget, teaching resources, 
and teaching practices. By congregating together in the PA, these parents could wield even more 
power over school practices. Whether acting individually or in coordination with one another, 
parents at School A participated in the school’s decision-making process as a way of enhancing 
their children’s education.  
This situation also applied to School B. Parents at School B who were involved as volunteers also 
created strong links with each other, maintained close contact with the principal and classroom 
teachers, and drew on resources to protect their children’s interests. As the head of the PA bluntly 
pointed out, many parents sought to be elected to the PA in order to strengthen opposition to the 
school’s aboriginal program. Furthermore, members of the PA persuaded the principal to apply 
for a “talented and gifted students” program in the hopes of both attracting better students to the 
school and producing graduates who end up attending a top-end high school. 
Although proximity was a popular reason for parents’ selection of School B, academic 
performance remained a major concern for many parents, especially those belonging to the new 
community, many of whom were not always impressed by School B in this regard. Indeed, it was 
the parents of the new community who were most likely to identify nearby alternatives and opt 
out of School B. And because their community and School B are on opposite sides of a river, and 
because transportation from their community to the school was not convenient, choosing another 
school was feasible. Moreover, parents who based their decision on academic performance tended 
to withdraw their children from School B. A parent whose oldest child attended school B and 
whose younger child attended an elementary school in the new community said, 
Every time I try to convince parents [who have a child in elementary school] to send their 
children to [School B], they always ask about the percentage of its graduates who go on to a top-
end high school. I just tell them it’s improving now. If smart students like yours come to our 
school, then it’ll be much better. How can we expect School B to boast of excellent performance 
if we keep sending our children to other schools? 
The parent continued,  
Many parents do not believe the school is academically sound. If everyone gets caught up in a 
superstar school’s name power, our community will never have a chance, since talented students 
will go elsewhere. If people don’t support their own community, it’ll never get better. Therefore, 
with my husband’s support, we keep our children at [School B]. 
The Act and related new policies have helped formally redraw the boundaries between parents 
and schools, effectively creating new incentives for parental involvement in school affairs. One 
aspect of these redrawn boundaries is an interaction between the policies of parental involvement 
(including choice) and parents’ sometimes fanatical preoccupation with their children’s exams. 
Unlike the education systems of Western countries, where a neo-liberal sense of parental choice 
rests on perceptions of school differentiation, the Taiwanese educational system has created a 
hierarchy of junior high schools ranked according to graduates’ performances on exams. The 
performance of a junior high school’s students on high school entrance exams heavily influence 
Taiwanese parents’ choice of school for their children. Most parents’ objective is to have their 
children positioned as high as possible on the academic totem pole. The test-driven admission 
system favours superstar schools. The new act ensures the role of the PA and promotes general 
parental involvement in schools. In this regard, some parents have gained ground in mobilizing 
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school resources to ensure that their own child’s “best” educational interests are met. A teacher at 
School A pointed out a salient irony: “People often say that our school has the quality of a private 
school but the price of a public school, but our efficiency [i.e., the school’s capacity to churn out 
graduates eligible for attendance at top-end high schools] is more like a cram school’s.”  
Following Taiwanese society’s awakening sense of citizenship rights, the public school system 
promotes parental participation. However, parents tend to exploit this feature of the system to 
expand resources that can strengthen their children’s performance on entrance exams. As a result, 
superstar schools do not have to fight for a greater share of the education market or struggle to 
find a market niche. All they have to do is to keep responding to parents’ demands for high exam 
scores. Such a cycle leaves little room for either innovation in school development or diversity in 
educational programs, both of which are critical if schools are to meet the diverse needs of 
students. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Taiwan’s school choice policy mixes a civil rights model with a market model. The former entails 
decentralization and giving more authority to schools and parents. Consumer choice drives the 
latter, in which parents act according to their own best interests when choosing a school. Such a 
mix consists of two ironies. First, the democratization-inspired impulse to strengthen people’s 
right to education derives largely from neo-liberal ideas of choice but has been channelled into 
initiatives that have widened the gaps between public schools. Although the Fundamental 
Education Act provides moral and legal grounds on which parents can choose schools and 
participate in school affairs, the very limited choice in terms of schools, programs, and curriculum 
means that “choice” is merely a catchword chiefly referring to the choice of public schools whose 
graduates perform well on exams. Moreover, Taiwan’s education policy encourages parental 
participation in educational matters in a way that can create further disparity among public 
schools and facilitate stratification in the public education system. 
The second irony is that in Taiwan’s public education system the value of social diversity and 
equity is contradicted by the value of market competition. Parents’ choice of and involvement in 
School A have made it highly competitive because it operates under the formidable pressure of 
parents’ constant monitoring and comparing. In contrast, most parents of School B seem 
relatively passive in terms of being market-based consumers. Even though School B was viewed 
as a part of the community, the sense of community was divided. In this sense, it can be seen that 
school choice along with parental involvement and participation can lead to heightened social 
competition and segregation rather than community management and improvement.  
Notes 
1. Because junior high graduates must take a very competitive entrance examination to attend 
senior high schools, parents pay particular attention to which junior high schools have a high 
percentage of graduates gaining admission to prestigious public senior high schools. This 
percentage has become the major indicator of school performance for parents when evaluating e 
junior high schools in a particular region (such as the Taipei metropolitan area). Such a ranking is 
not official, but rather popular information circulating among parents and the general public. 
Schools having a high percentage of graduates going to prestigious public senior high schools 
become the most desirable junior high schools. Such highly popular junior high schools are 
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